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1 Introduction 
1.1 Subject and purpose of the thesis 
For more than a decade, the working methods of the United Nations Security Council have 
been a topic of much debate within and outside the Security Council. Over the past few 
years, Council working methods and procedures related to its counter-terrorism work has 
received much attention from the media, regional organisations and legal scholars. The 
underlying issue being the 2005 World Summit Outcome which called on the Security 
Council ―to ensure that fair and clear procedure exist for placing individuals and entities on 
sanctions lists and removing them‖.1 
 
This paper analyses the procedures and working methods of the Security Council Sanctions 
Committee pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999). The focus of the paper is the Consolidated 
List maintained by this Committee. The Consolidated List, also known as the ―UN terrorist 
list‖, forms a catalogue over individuals and entities belonging to or associated with Al-
Qaida and the Taliban. Pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, listed 
individuals and entities are subjected to sanctions in which all Member States are obliged 
to implement. It falls within the scope of the thesis to describe and analyse the procedural 
rules of the Committee and the sanctions regime. While political and administrative in 
nature, the Committee’s procedures for including or removing names from this list poses 
legal challenges with respect to human rights norms. The thesis will be conducted from the 
hypothesis that listing and subsequent sanctions raise legal concerns related to the right to a 
fair trial, the right to effective remedies and civil rights.  
                                                 
1
 A/Res/60/1(2005), pp. 25-26, paras 106-110. The document outlines agreement between Heads of States at 
the High-Level Plenary Meeting, 60
th
 session of the UN General Assembly.  
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1.1.1 Delimitations  
At present there exists a variation of so called terrorist lists administrated by regional 
organisations such as the EU, or domestic (federal) lists such as the one compiled by the 
US Government.
2
 These lists fall outside the subject and purpose of the thesis.  
 
When reading this paper, one must keep in mind the distinction between the work of the 
Sanctions Committee pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1267 and the Counter 
Terrorism Committee (CTC) pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001). Both Committees share 
the same objective in fighting terrorism. However, the CTC is not a sanctions committee 
but an instrument to monitor the implementation of Resolution 1373.
3
 The CTC does not 
administer a list of terrorist organisations or individuals.  
 
It also falls outside the scope of the thesis to discuss Member State’s implementation and 
the effectiveness of the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime. Consequently, compliance by 
Member States will not be discussed.  
1.1.2 Terminology 
The paper will use terms and language consistent with the United Nations. There are for 
example many ways of writing the names ―Al-Qaida‖ and ―Usama bin Laden‖. To achieve 
consistency, the language and terminology applied by the UN in its official documents and 
publications will be utilized.  
 
The term ―due process of law‖ has in Common Law and Civil Law tradition been attributed 
various meanings. Due process may for example be interpreted as the conduct of legal 
proceedings according to established rules and principles for the protection and 
                                                 
2
 Cf. EU Council Regulation of 27 May 2002, (EC) No 881/2002, Annex I. Cf. US Department of the 
Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control’s list over ―Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons‖. 
Available at: http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/ [sited: 14 November 2007].    
3
 According to UN doc. SC/7827, press release (2003).   
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enforcement of private rights, including fair hearing before a tribunal.
4
 The Committee 
employs the terms ―procedural fairness‖ or ―due process‖ in its official documents.5 Hence, 
one may deduce that the content of the term ―procedural fairness‖ is comparatively similar 
to due process of law. It must be noted that this paper will focus on procedural due process 
as reflected in fundamental principles such as fair trial, effective remedies and judicial 
review.   
1.1.3 Methodology 
The legal setting for the thesis is the Charter of the United Nations.
6
 It forms the 
constitutional basis for the organisation and contains norms that regulate the mandate for 
the work of the Security Council.  
 
The paper will as point of departure examine Security Council resolutions related to the 
work of the 1267 Sanctions Committee. At present, there is no treaty under international 
law regulating the interpretation of Security Council resolutions. However, the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties will serve as guidance as it prescribes codified 
principles of customary international law.
7
 According to the main rule in Article 31 of the 
Convention, treaties should be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of the text and in light of the context and purpose of the treaty. In accordance with 
Article 32, supplementary sources (preparatory work of the treaty, judicial decisions or 
legal theory) are relevant if they confirm an interpretation based on the ordinary meaning 
of the treaty.   
 
The Guidelines of the 1267 Sanctions Committee prescribes the procedural rules for the 
conduct of its work.
8
 These guidelines are not defined by the Committee as a legal 
                                                 
4
 Black’s Law Dictionary (2004), pp. 538-539. 
5
 For example in UN doc. S/PV.5446 (2006) pp. 8 and 10. 
6
 Signed 26 June 1945 (San Francisco) entered into force 24 October 1945.   
7
 Adopted 23 May 1969 (Vienna). Customary status as referred to in Shaw (2003), p. 839.    
8
 See analysis of the Guidelines in sections 2-3. 
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instrument but rather seen as a policy document which may be amended under the consent 
of all members of the Committee. Interpretation of the Guidelines must therefore be 
conducted in relation to corresponding language in Security Council resolutions or public 
statements made by the Committee’s Chairman or the Monitoring Team for the 
Committee.
9
  
 
Under international law, certain international rules are recognized as more significant than 
others. These norms are defined as concepts of jus cogens and form a hierarchy of 
international law.
10
 The scope of these norms has long been debated, and the legal 
consequences for the Security Council have been questioned. The paper will examine both 
questions.   
 
The United Nations sanctions regime and procedures for listing does not fit into the 
traditional pattern of international law, hence human rights law. Human rights norms 
generally address States and their duty to promote and protect human rights.
11
 Here, 
fundamental rights are applied in connection with the actions of Member States when 
acting (collectively) in the Security Council. This approach has been voiced by legal 
commentators in recognized law journals and does also find support in recent regional 
jurisprudence. Both sources will be examined. When referring to the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights (UDHR) it is primarily meant to underline the recommendations laid 
down, as it is not a legally binding instrument.
12
 
 
Although my main approach will be to identify legal arguments, this thesis will also 
illustrate the interrelationships between policy and law on this subject.  
                                                 
9
 Monitoring Tem, cf. footnote 29. 
10
 These norms will be examined in section 4.2.5. 
11
 Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (2006) p. 6.  
12
 Brownlie (2003) pp. 534-535.  
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1.1.4 Structure  
I will in the next section give an overview of the 1267 Sanctions Committee composition 
and mandate, in order to analyse its legal basis and functions within the UN counter-
terrorism framework. Section 3 will analyse the Consolidated List. Procedural rules for 
listing and the substantive criteria for inclusion are important aspects in this regard. I will 
also examine the sanctions under the Committee’s mandate in order to give a better 
understanding of the scope of the Council’s non-forcible measures. In section 4, I pose the 
question as to whether or not the Security Council, when acting under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, is obliged to respect human rights. The aim is to present the arguments that the 
discussion has generated and in so doing outline the basis for my subsequent discussions. 
Section 5 discusses human rights (substantive and procedural), and challenges following 
directly from listing procedures and sanctions. Finally, in section 6 the aim is to address the 
existing lacuna with regard to judicial review for affected individuals and entities. Recent 
case law by European Courts will be applied.   
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2 The UN Security Council and the 1267 Sanctions Committee  
2.1 Introduction  
The Security Council is granted primary responsibility under the Charter of the United 
Nations (hereafter the Charter), for the maintenance of international peace and security.
13
 
Charging the Security Council with the primary responsibility is intended to ―ensure 
prompt and effective action by the United Nations‖.14 With a view to this responsibility, 
specific competences for the discharge of its duties are laid down in Chapter VII of the 
Charter.  
 
Chapter VII of the Charter contains provisions concerning: ―Action with Respect to Threats 
to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression‖. The Security Council may 
determine the existence of one of these situations under the Charter’s Article 39. It can 
decide provisional measures under Article 40 with the object of preventing an aggravation 
of the situation.
15
 Pursuant to Article 41 of the Charter, the Security Council may decide 
what measures ―not involving the use of armed force‖ to be applied in order to ―give effect 
to its decisions‖. When the Security Council compiles a list over Al-Qaida and Taliban 
related terrorists and imposes sanctions against them, it is in fact applying non-forcible 
measures.
16
 Decisions made by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter are 
binding upon all Member States, as set out in Articles 25 and 48.  
 
 
                                                 
13
 UN Charter, Article 24. 
14
 Cf. wording in Article 24 (1), UN Charter.  
15
 The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary (1994) p. 619.   
16
 Ibid, p. 625. Wording in Article 41 should not be interpreted as exhaustive.   
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2.2 The 1267 Sanctions Committee 
2.2.1  Background   
Resolution 1267 was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 15 October 1999. In 
this Resolution the Council voiced the indictment of Usama bin Laden and his associates 
for, inter alia, the bombing of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 
August 1998.
17
  
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, Resolution 1267 was adopted for the purpose of 
overseeing the implementation of sanctions on Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
18
 The 
Council was determined that the continued use of the Afghan territory to shelter, train and 
plan terrorist acts constituted a threat to international peace. Furthermore, the Security 
Council expressed its concerns with regard to the Taliban’s support of Usama bin Laden, 
and their refusal to turn him over to authorities in the country where he had been indicted.
19
  
2.2.2 Legal basis and establishment  
The 1267 Sanctions Committee, also known as ―the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions 
Committee‖ (hereafter the Committee), is a subsidiary body of the Security Council. The 
Committee was established pursuant to paragraph 6 of Resolution 1267 and in accordance 
with Article 29 of the Charter. The Committee is currently one out of twelve sanctions 
committees and represents one of the three subsidiary bodies that deal with terrorism.
20
 
                                                 
17
 S/Res/1267 (1999) p. 2.    
18
 S/Res/1267, p. 2, para.  4.   
19
  S/Res/1267, p. 2, para. 2 – ―Country‖ effectively meaning the United States.    
20
 As of 12 November 2007,  the following thematic Sanctions Committees exists: Somalia (1992), Rwanda 
(1994), Sierra Leone (1997), Al-Qaida/Taliban (1999), Iraq/Kuwait (2003), Liberia (2003), The D.R of 
Congo (2004), Côte d’Ivoire (2004), The Sudan (2005), Former Lebanese Prime Minister R. Hariri i.e. 
(2005), The Democratic People’s  Republic of Korea (2006) and Iran (2006). Other Counter-terrorism bodies 
are; The Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) and the Security Council 
Committee pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004). 
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2.2.3 The delegation of powers 
In accordance with Article 29 and as reflected in Rule 28 of the Council’s Provisional 
Rules of Procedure: ―The Security Council may establish such subsidiary bodies as it 
deems necessary for the performance of its functions‖.21 The objective of the Council’s 
delegation of powers was to create a body to coordinate, support and monitor the United 
Nations counter-terrorism work with respect to Al-Qaida and the Taliban.   
2.2.4 Committee composition and mandate 
The Committee is comprised of all members of the Security Council.
22
 The Chairman of 
the Committee (rotating presidency) is appointed by the Council and is assisted by two 
delegations which act as Vice-Chairmen.
23
 The Chairman is in his or her personal capacity 
in charge of Committee meetings.
24
  
 
It falls under the Committee’s mandate to administrate the Consolidated List and oversee 
the effective implementation of the sanctions regime.
25
 
2.2.5 Decision-making   
The Committee acts by procedural guidelines, it writes and adopts itself.
26
 Revisions or 
amendments to these guidelines are subjected to adoption by unanimous vote. 
Consequently, the Committee decides its own procedures. At first glance such a procedure 
may seem extraordinary. However, there are no provisions in the Council’s Provisional 
                                                 
21
 Cf. UN doc. S/96/Rev.7 (1983).  
22
 UN Charter, Article 23; five permanent members and ten non-permanent members (term of two-years).  
23
 Committee Guidelines, para. 2b).  
24
 H.E. Johan Verbeke (Belgium), term will expire on 31 December 2007. 
25
 S/Res/1267 p. 2, para. 6 and S/Res/1735 (2006), pp. 2-6. 
26
 Guidelines available at:  http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/1267_guidelines.pdf  [sited: 19 
November 2007].   
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Rules of Procedure that restricts such decision-making. Practice in fact shows that various 
UN sanctions committees have adopted the same approach.
27
  
 
As a primary rule, the Committee meets in closed sessions, by oral procedure.
28
 
Participation in Committee meetings is restricted to delegations of the members of the 
Committee, their own Secretariat and members of the Analytical Support and Sanctions 
Monitoring Team.
29
 However, the Committee may invite any member of the United 
Nations to participate in discussions, should any questions specifically affect that Member 
State.
30
    
 
Pursuant to paragraph 3b) in the Committee Guidelines, open discussions are facilitated 
only if the Committee considers it necessary. Practices by the various sanctions committees 
indicate that closed meetings have become an accepted working method.
31
  
 
All Committee decisions are based on consensus.
32
 In practice, this means that each 
member has a veto. The rationale behind the principle of consensus is to resolve or mitigate 
the objections of the minority. In this context, minority means non-permanent Member 
States of the Security Council. Should the Committee fail to reach consensus, the rules of 
procedure calls upon the Chairman of the Committee to undertake further consultations to 
facilitate agreement.
33
 The role as facilitator implies encouraging further discussions and 
                                                 
27
 Cf. Guidelines of the Committee pursuant to Resolution 1572 (Côte d’Ivoire), para. 6e), available at: 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1572/pdf/guidelines_ci_eng.pdf  [sited: 19 November 2007].  
28
 Committee Guidelines, para. 3b).   
29
 Committee Guidelines, paras 3 a, b and c). 
The New York based Monitoring Team was established under Resolution 1526 (2004), para. 7 to assist the 
Committee in fulfilling its mandate.      
30
 Committee Guidelines, para. 3b).   
31 Not limited to situations prescribed under Rule 48 of the Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure.   
32
 Committee Guidelines, para. 4a).   
33
 Ibid.   
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bilateral exchanges. If consensus cannot be reached after subsequent discussions; the case 
may be submitted to the Security Council.  
 
In the international effort to fight terrorism, consensus on the threat of Al-Qaida and the 
Taliban is of great importance and seen as a tool to increase credibility, legitimacy and 
effectiveness of decisions.
34
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21
st
 century (2004) pp. 237-238.   
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3 The Consolidated List  
3.1 Introduction 
As outlined above, the 1267 Committee has the overall responsibility for the Consolidated 
List. But what does this list consist of and who are subjected to listing? How are they 
designated and what kind of information can be found on the Consolidated List? These are 
some of the questions to be examined in the first part of this chapter. 
 
In the second part, the objective is to address the legal effects of being placed on the 
Committee’s List. The effects are clearly linked to the List itself and must therefore be 
described to further understand the comprehensive scope of the Security Council’s counter-
terrorism strategy against Al-Qaida and the Taliban.   
  
The last part of the chapter seeks to analyse the procedures (as revised 12 February 2007) 
and corresponding resolutions utilized by the Committee for removing names from the List 
(de-listing). The question on how one can contest an inclusion on the List is important in 
this regard.  
 
3.2 The List pursuant to Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, Taliban and their 
associates  
3.2.1 Purpose and legal basis of the List 
The Consolidated List (hereinafter the List), was introduced 8 March 2001 with legal basis 
under Resolution 1267. The list has been expanded in accordance with the extended 
mandate of the Committee.
35
  
 
Today, the List contains information about individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
associated with or belonging to Al-Qaida, Usama Bin Laden and the Taliban. The List is a 
                                                 
35
 UN S/Res/1333 (2000), UN S/Res/1390 (2002), UN S/Res/1455 (2003), UN S/Res/1526 (2004), UN 
S/Res/1617 (2005) and UN S/Res/1735 (2006).   
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key instrument for States to use when enforcing and implementing the sanctions regime 
against these subjects.   
3.2.2 Composition of the List 
The List is created as a printable document (PDF, XML or HTML-format) which consists 
of five sections.
36
 Sections A and B gives an overview of individuals and entities belonging 
to or associated with the Taliban.
37
 In sections C and D, individuals and entities belonging 
to or associated with Al-Qaida are listed.
38
 Finally, section E contains information on 
individuals and entities that have been removed from the list.
39
 Each name has a permanent 
reference number.  
 
The List is widely circulated to Ministries, banks and other financial institutions, border 
points, airports, seaports, customs agents, intelligence agencies and other relevant 
institutions in order to implement the sanctions regime. 
 
A total of 479 individuals and entities are currently listed, making it the largest and the 
most developed list of the Security Council Sanctions Committees.
40
 However, the List 
compiled by the Committee should not be viewed as an exhaustive compendium of every 
individual or entity known to be associated with or belonging to Al-Qaida and the Taliban. 
According to the Committee, not all individuals who should be on the List are in fact on 
it.
41
 The List is rather seen to reflect an international consensus on which members or 
associates of Al-Qaida and the Taliban present the main threat to the peace. Accordingly, 
                                                 
36
 Available at the Committee’s official website: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/index.shtml  [sited: 
19 November 2007]. Please note that a new format of the List was introduced 14 November 2007. 
37
 As of 14 November 2007: 142 individuals and 0 entities listed.   
38
 As of 14 November 2007: 225 individuals and 112 entities listed, making it the largest section.   
39
 Since the List was introduced in 1999, a total of 11 individuals and 24 entities have been removed. As 
reported on the official website14 November 2007.    
40
 In comparison, by the end of February 2005, the List had 433 entries. By the end of July 2006, 478 entries. 
In July 2006 the List contained 19 de-listed individuals and entities.  
41
 Certain well-known names are absent from the List, cf. UN doc. S/2006/22 (2006) p. 9, para. 32.   
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one might say that the credibility and legitimacy of the List is strengthened by the fact that 
all 15 Member States have agreed to place all 492 names on this list.  
3.2.3 Identifiers – information about listed individuals and entities 
For listed individuals the following set of identifiers exists: name(s), aliases, gender, title, 
occupation, date of birth, place of birth, nationality, residence, numbers of passports or 
travel documents, national identification number, current and previous addresses, date of 
listing and other information that might be relevant for identification.
42
 For groups, 
undertakings and entities: name(s), acronyms, address, headquarters, subsidiaries, affiliates, 
nature of business activity, leadership and current location is applied. A study of the List 
shows that many entries lack some of these identifiers. This might cause confusion when 
identifying targets and imposing sanctions.
43
  
3.2.3.1 The case of Mullah Krekar 
An illustrative example with regards to identifiers is the case of Mullah Krekar. On 7 
December 2006 the Committee listed Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad, also know as Mullah 
Krekar.
44
 This is currently the only name linked to Norway on the List. Najmuddin is 
currently residing in Norway as a refugee since 1991. Identifying information on the List 
refers specifically to his address in Oslo as well as date and place of birth and nationality.  
 
On 8 November 2007, the Norwegian Supreme Court unanimously upheld a government 
order to expel Najmuddin on the grounds that he represents a threat to Norwegian national 
security.
45
 The Court supported the government’s conclusion that Najmuddin was formerly 
a leader of Ansar al-Islam, a group with ties to the Al-Qaida network.
46
 In its ruling, the 
                                                 
42
 For example information on possible whereabouts, political affiliation, civil status or convictions.  
43
 Cf. Annex I to this paper.  
44
 The Consolidated List, reference QI.A.226.06. 
45
 HR-2007-01869-A. 
46
 Ibid, para 68. Ansar al-Islam was added to the Consolidated List on 24 February 2003 (QE.A.98.03).    
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Supreme Court noted that Najmuddin in his book had described meetings with prominent 
members within Al-Qaida.
47
 
3.2.4 Procedural rules for listing individuals and entities 
Names and relevant identifiers are proposed by Member States of the UN.
48
 States need not 
wait for a national administrative, civil or criminal proceeding to be brought or concluded 
against the individual or group before proposing the name for inclusion on the List. Once a 
proposal is received, it is circulated to all 15 Committee members, who have five working 
days to raise an objection.
49
 The final assessment and decision to apply the name to the 
Consolidated List is made collectively (on the basis of consensus).
50
  
 
As provided for in the Committee Guidelines, members of the Committee may challenge 
(block) a listing proposal or alternatively place a hold on the matter.
51
 The latter creates the 
legal basis for pending cases which must be reviewed no less than once a month.
52  
3.2.5 Statements of case (the evidence) 
Member States are advised to submit a confidential statement of case as justification for the 
name proposed for listing. According to the Watson Institute for International Studies, the 
Committee requires a narrative description and documentation for each listing.
53
 States are 
encouraged to provide as much information as possible and submit the names as soon as 
they gather the supporting evidence that demonstrates involvement with Al-
                                                 
47
 Ibid, para 69.  
48
 In S/Res/1735 (2006), the Council encouraged Member States to submit names. Cf. Committee Guidelines 
paras  6b). 
49
 Committee Guidelines, para. 4b). 
50
 Decision can be made after 5 working days (but after some weeks on average) if no objection is received. 
Information on which States have proposed which individuals or entities are not generally made public. 
Furthermore, multiple states may have proposed a name. Cf. Committee Guidelines, paras 4b) and 6f).     
51
 Committee Guidelines, para. 4c). 
52 Ibid, para. 4d).  
53
 Watson Institute (2006), p. 26.  
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Qaida/Taliban.
54
 According to paragraph 6d) of the Committee Guidelines, the following 
would qualify as evidence: findings demonstrating ―association‖, nature of the evidence 
(e.g. intelligence, law enforcement, judicial, media) and supporting evidence or other 
documentation that can be supplied.
55
 There is little transparency concerning the sources of 
information cited in these statements. The main reason for this is that statements consist of 
intelligence information, thus the need to preserve the confidentiality of classified 
documents is evident. However, current procedural guidelines, seeks to promote States to 
indicate what portion(s) of the statement might be made public.
56
  
 
What has to be further examined are the substantive rules by which an individual or entity 
may be added to the list.  
3.2.5.1 Criterion for listing  
The point of departure is paragraphs 2 and 3 in Resolution 1617 (2005). Paragraphs 2 and 3 
reads as follows:  
2. 
“Further decides that acts or activities indicating that an individual, group, 
undertaking, or entity is ―associated with‖ Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the 
Taliban include: 
 
– participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of 
acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in 
support of; 
 
– supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; 
 
– recruiting for; or 
 
– otherwise supporting acts or activities of; 
  Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban, or any cell, affiliate, splinter group or 
   derivative thereof;‖ 
                                                 
54
 States may contact other States bilaterally to seek additional information. Cf. Committee Guidelines para. 
6c).  
55
 Cf. annex I to S/Res/1735 (2006), enclosed as annex II to this paper.  
56
 This was first emphasised in the revised Guidelines of 29 November 2006.     
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3. 
―Further decides that any undertaking or entity owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by, or otherwise supporting, such an individual, group, undertaking or 
entity associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban shall be eligible 
for designation.‖ 
 
 
As laid down in the paragraphs referred to above, sanctions are to be imposed on 
individuals or entities, natural persons, groups, or undertakings “associated with” Al-
Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban. This includes undertakings owned or controlled 
(directly or indirectly) by Al-Qaida or the Taliban. Association is understood as a 
precondition for listing.  
 
The meaning of ―association‖ was not specified in earlier resolutions drafted by the 
Council.
57
 According to Husabø, one of the problems was that the criterion of ―association‖ 
did not relate to any acts of the individual.
58
 It is clear that the purpose of the provisions 
pursuant to Resolution 1617 (2005), has been to establish a legal definition and 
clarification of the acts and activities that indicate ―association” with Al-Qaida or the 
Taliban.   
 
First, Resolution 1617 paragraph 2 provides for a definition of the criterion of association 
by listing a number of ―acts or activities‖ to be assessed. The set of listed activities in 
conjunction with the wording “or”, indicates that these are alternative requirements. Thus, 
it is only necessary to assess the activity which seems to be most relevant. This is done on a 
case-by-case basis as soon as the Committee receives a listing request and supporting 
statements.   
 
Secondly, subparagraph 2 in paragraph 2 lists examples of preparatory acts, participation 
and acts that de facto have been carried out. The resolution does not specify what level of 
                                                 
57
 Cf. S/Res/1333 (2000), p. 4, para. 8c). 
58
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preparation, facilitation or other support may constitute association. With regard to ―acts or 
activities‖, only terrorist financing is explicitly mentioned in the Resolution. However, one 
should not interpret this as exhaustive. A wider interpretation is arguably supported by the 
extensive scope of the sanctions regime.  
 
Third, a person who ―supplies, sells or transfers arms and related material‖ to the subjects 
outlined above, could also be defined as an associate.  
 
Finally, individuals or entities – ―otherwise” supporting acts or activities conducted by Al-
Qaida, the Taliban and their associates would likewise be eligible for listing.
59
 But when is 
an individual or entity otherwise supporting acts of Al-Qaida/Taliban? The wording is 
found to be vague, thus signalizing a broad objective. Presumably covering activities not 
explicitly mentioned, such as for example kidnapping, murder, trafficking of arms, 
supplying fraudulent travel documents or recruitments for terrorist training camps.
60
 The 
rationale behind this flexibility may be the need to respond to changes in the situation. 
Nevertheless, the Watson Institute has recommended more detailed (but non-exhaustive) 
criterion for listing.
61
   
 
Furthermore, subparagraph 2 requires that the acts or activities should ―indicate‖ 
association with Al-Qaida/Taliban. A natural interpretation of this wording implies that the 
acts or activities should point towards association. However, when determining whether the 
activities ―indicate‖ association, Resolution 1617 does not call for requirements of a 
uniform standard of evidence such as the principle provided for in criminal law procedure. 
It is therefore the suspected or documented (should such material be available) 
participation, cooperation or facilitation which supports the Committee’s decisions. 
 
                                                 
59
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60
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61
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With respect to listings of entities or undertaking, there exists no public interpretation on 
what should be regarded as ―owned or controlled, directly or indirectly‖ by Al-Qaida or the 
Taliban. 
 
As has been pointed out, the Committee does not require that the individual or group in 
question has been faced with a criminal charge or conviction.
62
 In light of the wording 
provided for in resolutions and the Guidelines, it is not clear what level of evidence is 
required to list an identified individual or entity. Since it is held that the Consolidated List 
should not be viewed as a criminal mechanism but one of preventive nature, it must be 
deduced that evidentiary standards for listing may be lower than what is required for 
criminal legal action.
63
   
3.2.5.2 Lack of a uniform norm 
The term ―associated with” leaves much leeway for interpretation and there is no 
authoritative explanation of the term made public. This is problematic from a legal 
perspective because it creates a lacuna with respect to information on the Committee’s 
interpretations of the criterion. It also remains unclear where to draw the lower and upper 
lines with regard to ―association‖.64  
 
It could be questioned whether the definitions set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Resolution 
1617 resolves previous difficulties concerning the content of the criterion for listing. The 
serious nature of the List heightens the need to provide persons and groups with sufficient 
notice of conduct that might result in their listing. More information and increased 
transparency would effectively provide a better understanding and reassurance of impartial 
and non-arbitrary decisions.    
                                                 
62
 Committee Guidelines, para. 6c). 
63
 UN doc. S/2005/83 p. 17, para. 53 and Committee Guidelines para. 6c).  
64
 UN doc. S/2005/83 (2005) p. 11, para. 32. Monitoring Team has encouraged Member States to consult 
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What is clear however, is that in the absence of an internationally accepted definition of 
terrorism, the criterion: “association with Al-Qaida/Taliban‖ avoids the need for such an 
assessment. The rationale behind this is of course that if the criterion for listing were 
―terrorist activity‖ or even ―association with terrorists or terrorist organisations‖, consensus 
would be difficult to achieve. The Watson Institute argues that the criterion is too broad, but 
notes the positive progress following from Resolution 1617.
65
 The Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has stated the need to ensure a good listing 
process which is transparent, based on clear criteria and with an appropriate, explicit, and 
uniformly applied standard of evidence.
66
 Furthermore, in its third report, the Monitoring 
Team for the Committee emphasized the need for a basic definition of “association with”.  
3.2.6 Notification and dissemination of decisions 
The notification procedure is described in paragraph 6h) of the Guidelines. After a name 
and supporting identifiers are added to the List, the Secretariat of the Committee (provided 
by the Secretariat of the United Nations) makes a public announcement on the Committee’s 
official website (press release).
67
 The Permanent Mission of the country or countries where 
the individual is a citizen or believed to be located, are formally notified after the addition 
to the List is made public. According to the Guidelines, Governments (through their 
Permanent Missions to the UN) will receive notification within a two week period.
68
  
 
But at what point in the process is the designated individual notified?  
 
Notification of affected parties is not a precondition for listing. However, targeted 
individuals or entities are generally informed after the Committee’s decision is made 
                                                 
65
 Watson Institute (2006), p. 26. 
66
 Report: Expert Workshop on Human Rights and International Co-operation in Counter-Terrorism (2007), 
para. 42. 
67
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 Committee Guidelines, para. 6h). 
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public. The actual obligation to inform designated individuals lies on the affected 
State(s).
69
 This effectively means that the individual is the last in a chain of addressees. 
Thus, an individual or entity will receive notice after two weeks – at the earliest. Therefore, 
one cannot rule out that the individual or entity may receive notice through the media or 
other sources who have obtained information through the Committee’s own press releases.  
 
The formal notification from States must include information on the measures imposed on 
the individual/entity, listing and de-listing procedures and procedures for granting 
exemptions. The Guidelines does not require that Member States inform affected 
individuals about the reasons for inclusion on the List.
70
   
 
A clear weakness in the procedures is the lack of a time limit for notifications. With respect 
to current procedures, an individual may not obtain actual notice before weeks or even 
months have past. The procedure has been criticized as inadequate with respect to due 
process because many Member States lack general capacity or will to carry out 
notifications.
71
 From the designated individuals’ perspective, proper notification is essential 
when assessing if treated fair. Direct or parallel notification by a UN body should therefore 
be considered built into the current system.
72
 
3.2.7 Periodic review of listings 
As a main rule, there are no time limits to listings unless the Committee decides otherwise.  
However, current procedures mandate periodic reviews of issues already pending before 
the Committee. Pending issues are reviewed monthly.
73
 Names on the Consolidated List 
that have not been updated in four years or more are subjected to circulation between 
members of the Committee to assess update or removal. Despite the possibility of review, a 
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listing can continue indefinitely. It can therefore be argued that the List not always reflects 
the changing nature of the threat.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
In spite of the norms for identifiers, there is often a gap between the amount of information 
required and the details available on the List.
74
 The Committee has acknowledged the 
problem with inaccuracy and with the help of the Monitoring Team taken a more proactive 
approach with regard to updates - thereby reducing the possibility of innocent parties with 
names similar to those listed being caught up by sanctions.
75
 
 
3.3 Targeted Sanctions 
3.3.1 Background 
Sanctions against Al-Qaida and the Taliban have their origin in SC Resolution 1267, by 
which the Council required Member States to impose sanctions on designated members of 
the Taliban (Afghan territory). The Council modified the targets under Resolutions 1333 
(2000), 1363 (2001) culminating in Resolution 1390 (2002) to include Al-Qaida and their 
associates. 
 
The sanctions regime consists of three principal measures: asset freeze (financial 
measures), travel ban and the arms embargo.
76
 All Member States are obliged to implement 
the sanctions on individuals and entities on the Consolidated List. All three measures are 
automatically applied on the national level without a judicial process against the affected 
parties.
77
 This follows from the binding effect of Security Council decisions under Articles 
25 and 48 of the Charter.  
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3.3.2 The freezing of assets 
The point of departure is paragraph 4b) in Resolutions 1267 and paragraphs 1 and 2a) in 
Resolution 1390. The resolutions introduced the obligation to freeze Taliban and Al-
Qaida’s financial resources. Assets or financial resources are broadly defined as cash, 
cheques, money orders, deposits, balance on accounts, trusts, stocks, insurance money and 
precious commodities to name a few.
78
 
 
An important modification to the asset freeze is the practice to grant derogation from the 
freezing of funds on humanitarian grounds.
79
 The asset freeze does not apply to funds and 
other financial assets or economic resources determined by the relevant State(s) as: 
necessary for basic expenses (food, utilities, rent, mortgage, medical treatment, tax, legal 
services) or necessary extraordinary expenses.
80
 It can be argued that targeted sanctions are 
proportionate because individuals are not deprived of funds for basic needs.   
 
To exempt (release or add to) frozen funds, the Committee must be notified for 
consideration and authorization on a case-by-case basis.
81
 In the case of the release of 
funds, Member States play an important role as intermediary between the listed individual 
or entity and the Committee. However, there may be circumstances were Member States 
lack resources or for some reason are reluctant to forward petitions for exemptions.
82
 It 
should be noted that there are no formal records on how many exemption requests that do 
not reach the Committee because of reluctance from Member States.  
3.3.3 The arms embargo 
The arms embargo is one of the most traditional measures employed by the various 
Sanctions Committees. The arms embargo against Al-Qaida and the Taliban was 
                                                 
78
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established under paragraph 2 of SC Resolution 1390 (2002) and aims at ―preventing the 
direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material‖ in order to interrupt 
possible military operations. According to the Committee arms are defined as (but not 
limited to) weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, technical advice, 
assistance or training related to military activities.
83
 
3.3.4 The travel ban 
The travel ban has its legal basis in Security Council Resolution 1333 (2000), enhanced by 
Resolution 1390 (2002). The travel ban is only applicable to listed individuals. According 
to the Monitoring Team for the 1267 Committee, travel restrictions have been used as 
sanctions measures for nearly 40 years.
84
 In accordance with the Consolidated List, all 
Member States through their designated national border authorities are required to deny 
entry, transit through or departure of listed individuals. Entry, transit or departure is denied 
by seizing travel documents, identity cards, driving licences as well as by executing 
cancellations of visas or residence permits. Accordingly, the travel ban requires attention to 
the possible use of altered, fraudulent or stolen travel documents.   
3.3.5 From comprehensive sanctions to targeted sanctions 
Within the scope of the Security Council resolutions outlined above, all these sanctions are 
amongst scholars defined as ―targeted sanctions‖ or ―smart‖ sanctions.85 Both conceptions 
has gained general acceptance. The terms refer to sanctions that are imposed directly on 
individuals or entities whose identity and whereabouts are known. Thus, targeted sanctions 
are imposed on non-State actors, without any necessary link to a specific territory or 
regime.
86
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Historically, the Security Council has been accustomed to imposing sanctions on States. 
The sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban however, orders each Member State 
to implement sanctions on identified individuals and entities as reflected on the List. It is 
argued that such ―targeted‖ sanctions or ―smart‖ sanctions represent a qualitative change in 
Security Council sanctions policy and arguably a change in the interpretation of Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.
87
 
 
What is the legal and political explanation for targeting individuals and not States?   
 
First, Member States and humanitarian organizations have expressed concerns about the 
unintended effects of comprehensive economic sanctions on vulnerable segments of the 
population and the work of humanitarian agencies.
88
 Second, concerns have also been 
expressed about the possible negative impact sanctions have on the economy of third 
countries or neighbour countries.
89
 Targeted sanctions must be seen as a result of lessons 
learned from these experienced difficulties. Targeted sanctions are also seen as less 
controversial because they are not meant to affect the population as a whole. ―Smart 
sanctions‖ targets identified actors and are strictly seen as preventive.90 Yet, it is argued 
that the general aim is behavioural modification.
91
 Whilst the Security Council emphasizes 
that the measures against Al-Qaida/Taliban are preventive in nature, Cameron has argued 
that the sanctions are quasi-criminal in nature.
92
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3.4 Removing names from the Consolidated List (de-listing) 
A positive decision by the Committee to remove a name from the List means that, 
sanctions (as outlined above) seize to have effect and that the name is moved to the ―de-
listed‖ section of the Consolidated List. At present it is not clear how many parties have 
sought to be de-listed, claiming to have been wrongfully placed or retained on the List.   
3.4.1 Procedural rules for de-listing individuals and entities 
The point of departure is Security Council Resolution 1735 (2006) and paragraph 8 of the 
Committee Guidelines. The petitioner (individual, group, undertaking or entity on the 
Consolidated List) must as a main rule actively approach the Committee by submitting a 
petition requesting review of his/her case.  
 
There are currently two ways in which a petitioner may submit a request for de-listing: 
Either through the focal point at the United Nations Secretariat or through its State of 
residence/citizenship.
93
 The latter may be described as the diplomatic remedy.  
 
If the petitioner should choose the diplomatic remedy, paragraph 8e) of the Guidelines 
provides that the request must be submitted to the State where he or she is a citizen or 
resident. The State of residence/citizenship should review relevant information in support 
of de-listing and approach the original designating State(s) bilaterally. After bilateral 
consultations, it should forward the petition to the Committee. According to the wording in 
the Guidelines, the petitioned State is not obliged to pursue bilateral consultations or even 
review the information. It is only encouraged to do so.
94
 However, should the State wish to 
conduct a review of the case, it is still within the State’s discretion to assess whether or not 
to pursue the Committee with an actual de-listing request.
95
 According to the Watson 
Institute, the diplomatic remedy has been met with concerns.
96
 Practice has shown that if a 
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Member State refuses or is not sympathetic to de-listing, the petition might not be 
presented for the Committee, regardless of its merits.
97
 Thus, the diplomatic remedy leaves 
the petitioner no guarantee of review. It is necessary to note that there are no formal records 
over requests through States that never make it to the Committee. 
 
The focal point process, however, is an institutionalized administrative appeal procedure. It 
was established pursuant to Resolution 1730 (2006), partly resulting from concerns that the 
diplomatic remedy might be insufficient.
98
  
 
Committee Guideline paragraph 8b) provides that a petitioner may submit the request for 
deletion of its name straight to this focal point. The administrative focal point would then 
acknowledge receipt of the request and inform the petitioner about general procedures. It 
should be added that the focal point has no mandate or competence to assess the substance 
of the request.
99
 It is strictly a facilitator for discussion and in charge of notifying the 
petitioner of the Committee’s final decision. One could define the role of the focal point as 
a securer for correct procedure and a liaison between designating and petitioned 
Governments.    
  
On this basis, the focal point forwards the de-listing request to the designating 
Government(s) and to the Government(s) of citizenship and residence.
100
 This is done 
mainly in order to inform, but also to facilitate possible comments. The procedural rules 
encourage Government(s) of citizenship and residence to consult with the designating 
Government(s) before recommending de-listing.
101
 In addition, bilateral consultations can 
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be facilitated by the focal point. After such consultations, recommendations of the involved 
Governments are forwarded by the focal point to the Chairman of the Committee, in order 
to place the petition on the Committee’s agenda.102 This recommendation would be 
accompanied by an explanation.  
 
Should none of the Governments involved recommend de-listing, then the focal point 
would after a reasonable period (three months) forward the petition to all members of the 
Committee for additional review.
103
 At that point, any member could make 
recommendations for de-listing. If after one month no Committee member recommends de-
listing, then it shall be deemed rejected.    
 
It must be stressed that the focal point procedure pursuant to Resolution 1730 (2006) does 
not generate new rules for decision-making. For both de-listing procedures, it is within the 
Committee’s prerogative (consensually) to remove the name from the List. Thus removal 
can still be prevented by the objection of one single member.
104
  
3.4.2 Criterion for de-listing 
The substantive criteria for de-listing are specified in Resolution 1735 (2006). Paragraph 14 
provides that the Committee in determining whether to remove names from the 
Consolidated List may consider (amongst other things): first, whether the initial inclusion 
on the List was due to mistake of identity. Second, whether the individual or entity no 
longer meets the criterion set out in Resolution 1617. In making the assessment the 
Committee may consider (amongst other things) whether the individual is deceased or 
whether it has been affirmatively shown that the individual or entity has severed all 
association with Al-Qaida/Taliban. The meaning of ―association‖ in Resolutions 1735 and 
1617 are effectively synonyms. However, it is difficult to assess what ―severing all 
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association‖ requires in this context. A natural interpretation of the wording implies 
separation or disconnection from something or someone. Again, with this wording the 
Security Council has left the Committee wide discretional powers.  
 
Furthermore, the Guidelines of the Committee provide that it is the petitioner who must 
justify the request to be removed from the List.
105
 This should be done by compiling 
information in support of the requirements for de-listing. However, there exists no 
guidance as to what constitutes an adequate or satisfactory justification. Furthermore, there 
exists no explanation as to the degree of information required. In other words, the petitioner 
has the burden of proof whiles not knowing what decisive proof to present to the 
Committee. Due to confidentiality and lack of transparency one cannot contradict the 
content of the documentation compiled by Member States. The principle of presumption of 
innocence seems absent here. I will return to this question in section 5.2.5.    
3.4.3 Concluding observations 
On the background of the arguments provided for above, it could be said that it is solely 
within the discretional powers of the Committee to ensure that the conditions for de-listing 
and listing are met and that each case fits the scope of the sanctions programme. 
Consequently, Member States (especially countries not currently serving on the Security 
Council) must entrust that the Committee and the Council, in its pursuit to determine who 
constitutes ―a threat to the peace‖, makes thorough assessments in each case, striking a 
balance between the ―threat‖ and the sanctions to be imposed. Yet one must acknowledge 
that neither the Security Council nor the Committee can guarantee that no error of 
assessment of the facts and evidence relied upon have been made. 
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4 Human Rights law – is it applicable to the work of the Security Council? 
4.1 Introduction 
As examined above, the Security Council may affect a person’s individual rights when 
placing his/her name on the List and applying sanctions. The High Commissioner for 
Human Rights contends that certain procedural rules of the Committee may infringe upon 
human rights standards and principles of due process.
106
 In determining whether listing and 
de-listing procedures possibly infringe upon human rights norms, one must first assess 
whether human rights law poses legal constraints on the work of the Security Council.    
4.2 The Security Council and human rights obligations  
Since 1945, a comprehensive framework of human rights law has been drafted. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly in 1948. 
Following the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil 
and Political Rights, both adopted in 1966. In addition, regional human rights instruments 
such as the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms have been drafted.  
4.2.1 Constituent legal basis for human rights  
According to the preamble of the Charter, Member States ‖reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person…‖ It is further stated in the 
Charter’s Article 1(3) that the promotion and respect for human rights are one of the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations. Article 1(3) is an umbrella provision, 
relevant to the application of all other Articles of the Charter.  
 
Article 24(2) of the Charter emphasizes that the Security Council, in discharging its duties, 
―shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations‖. 
Furthermore, Articles 55(c) and 56 reaffirms the organisations task to promote universal 
respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Therefore, in 
                                                 
106
 UN doc. A/HRC/4/88 (2007) p. 10, para. 25. 
 30 
accordance with the wording of the provisions and the principle of constitutionality, the 
Security Council has an obligation to secure that decisions are in conformity with their 
constituent instruments. Thus, listing pursuant to sanctions should be evidence of the 
application and consideration for fundamental human rights.  
 
However, the references to human rights in Articles 1(3) and 55(c) are broad and vague, as 
the drafters of the Charter did not specify the scope of human rights. According to the 
legislative history, the purposes and principles were designed to provide a guide to the 
organs of the United Nations in a flexible manner.
107
 De Wet argues that this wording does 
not prevent one from identifying the core content of human rights in question because they 
can be derived from the rights guaranteed in the International Bill of Rights (i.e. UDHR, 
ICCPR and ICESCR), which represents the Charter’s original vision of human rights.108 
This provides the argument that the Council has human rights obligations on the basis that 
part of this legal framework is seen as created under the organisation’s own auspices.    
4.2.2 Implications of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
The idea behind fundamental human rights is to protect interests of individuals.
109
 They are 
rights not disposable by any State and drafted with a view to the performance of States.
110
 
Therefore, the UN being an autonomous subject is not and cannot become a party to or 
accede to any universal or regional human rights treaties. This follows from the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties Article 34(1). Moreover, this provides the argument that 
the Security Council is not directly bound to international human rights instruments. 
Furthermore, the proposition that the Council is bound to the treaties (as referred to above) 
simply because most Member States and permanent members of the Council have ratified 
human rights instruments seems insufficient.
111
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4.2.3 The relevance of Security Council practices and statements 
There is also the argument that the Security Council has generated an ―expectation of 
respect‖ for human rights standards because of the institutional practice of the Council and 
other UN organs. For example, in the course of time and by consensus, practice can result 
in a new interpretation of the Charter’s provisions and obligations. Alvares has opted for 
the view that such institutional practice is relevant for the interpretation of the Charter, as 
provided for under the standard rules of treaty interpretation in Article 31(2) of the Vienna 
Convention.
112
 On 12 February 2007, the Committee unanimously agreed upon 
comprehensive revisions to its own procedures. In this process the Committee observed 
possible implications for the rights of affected individuals. Former Chairman of the 
Committee, Mayoral (Argentina), has also voiced that international human rights standards 
are of high importance when countering terrorism.
113
 In this way, the Council and the 
Committee create the presumption that human rights are to be considered when 
implementing Chapter VII measures.  
4.2.4 Chapter VII measures versus human rights  
The UN Charter Article 1(1) stresses that the main purpose of the Security Council is to 
maintain international peace and security and take effective collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace. In Lysén’s view; ―This means that the 
promotion of human rights is of supplementary means only to this main task…‖114 He 
further argues that this prime objective (maintenance of international peace and security) 
prevails over any other obligations of states under international law.
115
  
 
The Security Council is mandated to ensure prompt and effective action by the UN. This is 
evident when the Committee executes its decisions to place names of individuals or entities 
on the List with the objective to apply immediate sanctions. It can therefore seem as if the 
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absence of international peace offers less room for practicing human rights. And rightly so, 
under Chapter VII of the Charter the Council may in its lawful right restrict the application 
of human rights and international law when acting in the interest of international peace and 
security. The Council may do so with legal basis in the human rights instruments which – 
by analogy permits derogation from certain provisions during states of emergency.
116
  
 
The question is however, whether the wording in Article 103 of the Charter can be 
interpreted as legal basis for the Council to restrict the application of human rights by 
Member States in the event of conflict between the UN Charter and other treaty 
obligations. In a judgement concerning the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee, the 
Court of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI) held that UN Member State’s 
obligations under the Charter prevail (lex superior) over any other treaty obligation.
117
 This 
includes obligations under the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms.
118
 It was also held that this paramountcy extends to decisions 
of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter.
119
 Should one support 
the Courts interpretation, one must at the same time acknowledge that Member States may 
derogate from human rights obligations when acting collectively in the Security Council. 
However, in the European Court of Human Rights’ view, State action taken in compliance 
with legal obligations under the Charter is justified as long as the relevant organisation is 
considered to protect fundamental rights.
120
 This interpretation seems in line with the 
principle of good faith and the Charter’s purposes and principles.  
4.2.5 The impact of peremptory norms (jus cogens) on Security Council measures   
If one were to conclude that the Charter does not oblige the Security Council to consider 
human rights when placing individuals on the List, then the question becomes if Article 
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1(3) in the Charter imposes the Council a presumptive duty to respect all customary human 
rights norms. The vast majority of States and authoritative writers recognize that the 
fundamental principles of human rights form part of customary or general international 
law.
121
 
 
The Charter does also impose a presumptive duty to respect norms that are jus cogens. Jus 
cogens is understood as peremptory norms of general international law, accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as norms from which no derogation is 
permitted.
122
 It is found to be generally accepted international law that the Security Council 
must respect peremptory norms and cannot oblige Member States to act contrary to rules of 
jus cogens.
123
 Thus, peremptory human rights norms prevail over the UN Charter and 
become an inherent limitation on the Committee’s powers. As Judge Lauterpacht of the 
International Court of Justice emphasized in the Bosnia case, jus cogens unconditionally 
binds the UN Security Council.
124
 Reference should also be made to the concurring 
statement made by the Appeals Chamber for the International Criminal Tribunal for former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the Tadic case of 1999.
125
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5 Human Rights concerns following from listing procedures and sanctions 
5.1 Introduction  
In the document entitled “A more secure world: our shared responsibility”, the United 
Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change noted that: ―The way entities 
or individuals are added to the terrorist list maintained by the Council and the absence of 
review or appeal for those listed raise serious accountability issues and possibly violate 
fundamental human rights norms and conventions‖.126 The same view seems to be shared 
by the High Commissioner for human rights. In a recent report before the Human Rights 
Council, the High Commissioner voiced that: ―While the system of targeted sanctions 
represent an improvement over the former system of comprehensive sanctions, it 
nonetheless continues to pose a number of serious human rights concerns related to the lack 
of transparency and due process in listing and de-listing procedures‖.127  
 
In the present section, it falls to be further identified - the potentially violated substantial 
and procedural rights related to individuals on the List. I shall first identify the relevant 
rights and then discuss possible legal challenges. There will be a focus on the financial 
sanctions.  
 
Since, a common agreement on which human rights norms the Council and the Committee 
are bound to do not exist, I will (where relevant) as secondary argument assess whether the 
applicable rights can be regarded as norms of jus cogens. Recent case law by the Court of 
First Instance of the European Community (CFI) will also be analysed.   
 
 
                                                 
126
 UN doc. A/59/565 (2004), p. 47, para.152, refers to the work of Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee. 
127
 UN doc. A/HRC/4/88, (2007), p. 10, para. 25. 
 35 
5.2 Procedural rights (due process) 
5.2.1 The right to a fair trial 
One of the most pressing human rights concerns with respect to individuals on the 
Consolidated List relates to the right to a fair trial.  
 
The right to a fair trial is generally included in Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR). The provision states that: 
 
―Everyone is entitled to a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the 
determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him‖.  
 
In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to fair trial is 
recorded in Article 14(1) and provides that:  
 
―… In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations 
in a suit of law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law…‖  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) Article 
6(1) further specifies that:  
 
―In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal…‖  
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5.2.2 Impartiality 
The terms ―competent‖ and ―established‖ by law in Articles 14(1) of the ICCPR and 6(1) 
of the ECHR are effectively synonyms aimed at ensuring that the jurisdictional powers of a 
tribunal is determined generally and independently. Furthermore, courts and tribunals must 
be independent and the judges impartial.
128
 By analogy, this institutional principle is put to 
the test when applied to the Committee’s de-listing procedures. As has been pointed out, 
the final decision to remove a name from the List is taken pursuant to consensus by all 15 
Committee members. This means that the same members of the Committee who decided to 
place an individual on the list must also vote in favour or against a de-listing request. In the 
same way that a judge participating in a judgement at first instance is disqualified from 
judging in the appeal; one may comparatively question the objectiveness behind Committee 
decisions in de-listing cases.
129
 With regard to de-listing, there is also reason to believe that 
the principle of consensus combined with the lack of an independent review body may lead 
to decisions suffering from arbitrariness. One could for example contend that when the 
State that proposes a name for listing (designating State) also is a member of the 
Committee – an impartial review process is threatened. One must subsequently ask whether 
the members of the Committee are able to assess a de-listing request with fresh eyes, solely 
on the grounds of what is put forward by the petitioner. This question will be discussed 
further under section 5.2.5.  
5.2.3 Determination of a “criminal charge”       
Article 14(1) of the ICCPR and the standards set out by Article 6(1) of the ECHR only 
applies to cases where the determination of a ―criminal charge‖ is involved or where 
―rights and obligations in a suit of law‖ are at stake. The term ―criminal charge‖ in Article 
14 (1) of the ICCPR has not yet been determined by the Human Rights Committee. As this 
term corresponds with the wording in Article 6(1) of the ECHR, the jurisprudence by the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR) will serve as guidance. 
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 The first question to be assessed is whether listing and the imposition of sanctions qualifies 
as ―criminal‖ within the ambit of the ICCPR and the ECHR or whether they are 
administrative measures outside the scope of the Conventions.   
 
―Criminal charge‖ bears an autonomous Convention meaning which applies irrespective of 
the definition of a criminal charge in domestic law.
130
 According to the ECtHR a ―charge‖ 
can be defined as ―the official notification given to an individual by the competent 
authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence‖.131 The notification 
marks the beginning of the ―charge‖. From this definition, one could argue that when the 
State of residence notifies an individual of his/her inclusion on the List, the person may 
deduce that there is incriminating evidence against him. Consequently, notification may 
very well be experienced as implying an allegation of involvement in terrorism. Thus 
substantially affecting his situation and the need for the guarantees provided for by the 
Convention.  
5.2.3.1 Classification of the allegedly violated norm      
On the domestic level States Parties are free to designate matters as either disciplinary or 
administrative. If the charge is classified as criminal, Article 6 will apply automatically.
132
 
However, if the charge is not classified as criminal, then this is not decisive for the 
application of the fair trial guarantees.
133
 The Monitoring Team for the 1267 Committee 
has consistently held that the List should not be viewed as a criminal list and that sanctions 
do not impose a criminal punishment or procedure such as for example detention, arrest or 
extradition.
134
 Instead, asset freezing and the prohibition of international travel are defined 
as administrative measures.
135
 Based on ECtHR jurisprudence, how the Committee or the 
Monitoring Team defines these measures are not decisive in order to statute a ―criminal 
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charge‖. What is relevant is the ―autonomous meaning‖, hence the nature and purpose of 
the offence, and the severity of the penalty or sanction at stake.
136
  
 
With regard to the ―criminal‖ aspect, this assessment has to be made based on objective 
principles. The ECtHR has in its case law developed the following additional criteria.  
5.2.3.2 Scope of the violated norm 
First, the scope of the norm concerns the circle of its addressees. For example, a provision 
of disciplinary law generally addresses persons belonging to the disciplinary system.
137
 The 
scope of the Consolidated List is specified as individuals and entities found to be associated 
with or belonging to Al-Qaida or the Taliban. The ECtHR has submitted that norms 
governing the conduct of a certain group of people (for example a specific profession), 
would indicate that one has to do with a disciplinary and not a criminal norm. However, if 
the norm potentially affects the whole population, and to which it attaches a punitive 
sanction, it is consider criminal.
138
 The Consolidated List has a global scope and the norm 
set out in Resolution 1617 may potentially affect individuals and entities from all parts of 
the world not restricted to a certain profession, class, gender or race.  
5.2.3.3 The purpose of the penalty      
Second, the ECtHR has added to its argumentation the criterion on the ―purpose of the 
penalty‖.139 This alternative criterion seeks to distinguish between criminal and 
administrative sanctions. Jurisprudence shows that ECtHR has treated the loss of remission 
or of a driving licence as a criminal charge.
140
 In comparison, individuals on the 
Consolidated List are imposed sanctions on the basis of their association with Al-Qaida or 
the Taliban. One could argue that this is a greater measure compared to loss of remission.  
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It is also argued that the purpose of the sanctions appears to be punitive.
141
 The effects of 
the sanctions are arguably similar to criminal sanctions or at least quasi-criminal.
142
  
Furthermore, the listing criterion and the language in Resolution 1617 paragraphs 2 and 3 
are very similar to criminal offences (criminal connotation).
143
   
5.2.3.4 The nature and severity of the penalty      
Finally, if the purpose of the penalty does not make Article 6 applicable, the Court will 
then have to look at the second alternative criterion; ―nature and severity‖. Should 
however, the Court conclude that the first alternative criterion (purpose of penalty) is met; 
then the nature and severity of the penalty are no longer relevant.  
 
Imprisonment is considered to be the criminal penalty par excellence. It is self-evident that 
the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions regime does not prescribe any deprivation of liberty. It is 
also difficult to contend that listing in itself is a penalty in the meaning of the ECHR or the 
ICCPR. A relevant question however, is whether listing pursuant to freezing assets are of a 
nature comparable to criminal sanctions. 
   
In the case Phillips v. UK, the ECtHR ruled that proceedings for the confiscation of the 
assets of a convicted criminal (presumed earnings from drug trafficking) was not the 
―determination of a criminal charge‖.144 One can thus contend that the freezing of assets 
with a view to interrupt economic relations with terrorist organisations is a lesser measure 
than confiscation, and thereby not covered by the Convention. On the other hand, the 
ECtHR has in its jurisprudence held that the criminal nature of the offence does not require 
a certain degree of seriousness.
145
 In the Öztürk case, the Court reiterated that an offence of 
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a minor nature is of no relevance under this criterion.
146
 Thus, to freeze or confiscate a 
person’s assets based on the allegation of terrorist financing may be considered severe in 
nature.  
 
De Wet contends that the severity of the punishment (freezing of assets) serves to qualify as 
de facto criminal charges.
147
 Her assessment seems to be based on an examination of the 
possible impact the Committee’s sanctions has on the targeted individual. This observation 
is supported by the applicant (Yassin Abdullah Kadi, hereafter Kadi) in a case before the 
European Court of First Instance of the European Communities (hereafter CFI).
148
 Kadi 
observed that, ―by being listed, he had been accused of the most serious form of criminal 
wrongdoing, namely, involvement in a terrorist organisation‖.149  
5.2.3.5 Background in the Kadi case 
On 18 December 2001, Kadi, a Saudi Arabian businessman filed a case before the CFI 
challenging the financial sanctions imposed against him. The applicant alleged that his 
fundamental right to a fair trial, effective judicial review and respect for property had been 
breached. The CFI ruled against the applicant and dismissed all three claims. Kadi was 
included on the Consolidated List (Al-Qaida section) on 17 October 2001.
150
 
 
Listings do not include an ―end date‖.151 Information provided on the List shows that there 
are sanctioned individuals who have been listed for more than five years, making the asset 
freeze, travel ban and embargo seem punitive and deterrent. One can therefore supplement 
to the discussion the argument that, the longer a person is on the list and the longer his or 
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her assets are frozen, the closer becomes the reality of a criminal charge.
152
 Thus, these 
sanctions can no longer be exclusively defined as emergency measures.  
 
The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights while Countering Terrorism is of the opinion 
that, permanent sanctions linked to inclusion on terrorist lists may fall within the scope of 
criminal sanctions for the purposes of international human rights law.
153
    
 
As demonstrated, there is room for discussion as to whether the Al-Qaida/Taliban sanctions 
regime fall within the realm of criminal sanctions or administrative measures. If one 
concludes that the imposition of sanctions on listed persons is a criminal charge, then this 
would subsequently trigger the extensive procedural rights guaranteed in Articles 14 of the 
ICCPR and 6 of the ECHR. The latter will become the point of departure for the following 
examination.  
5.2.4 The right to be informed 
One of the minimum guarantees prescribed by ECHR Article 6(3a) and Article 14 3(a) of 
the ICCPR, concerns the right to be informed promptly of the charge or accusation against 
him. As examined above, the Committee acknowledges listed parties’ need for information. 
Affected individuals or entities are as primary rule informed of inclusion on the List, the 
procedures for de-listing and procedures for humanitarian exemptions. The Human Rights 
Committee has noted that the legal requirements may be met by disseminating the 
information either orally or in writing.
154
 This is done by the Committee on a case-by-case 
basis.
155
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With respect to the content of the notice, the Human Rights Committee submits that the 
notice should also indicate the alleged facts on which it is based.
156
 As has been 
emphasized, the grounds for inclusion on the list are generally not provided. However, in 
the recently adopted Resolution 1735 (2006) paragraph 10, the Security Council now 
obliges Member States to include with the notification a copy of the publicly releasable 
portion of the statement. Such an obligation undeniably improves the listed individual or 
entity’s understanding of the grounds for inclusion on the List. However, uncertainty arises 
with respect to how much of the content of statements (evidence) are required 
disseminated. The language in Resolution 1735 does not provide a uniform standard with 
regards to the meaning of ―publicly releasable‖. As the reasons for inclusion on the List 
initially stems from information provided by the designating State(s), it must be deduced 
that it is within Member States discretion to assess what should be considered as public 
information.  
 
To release confidential State intelligence material is generally a sensitive issue and when 
left upon State discretion, variations from country to country may apply. In the Kadi case 
the CFI held that:  
 
...‖facts and evidence, once classified as confidential or secret by the State which 
made the Sanctions Committee aware of them, are not, obviously, communicated to 
him, any more than they are to the Member States of the United Nations…‖157  
 
The Court further considered that: … 
 
...―observance of the fundamental rights of the person concerned does not require 
the facts and evidence adduced against him to be communicated to him, once the 
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Security Council or its Sanctions Committee is of the view that there are grounds 
concerning the international community’s security that militate against it‖.158 
 
5.2.5 The presumption of innocence      
Article 14(2) of the ICCPR and Article 6(2) of the ECHR provides that everyone charged 
with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. 
The same principle is recorded in Article 11(1) of the UDHR. The presumption of 
innocence is fundamental to the protection of human rights and the rule of law.  
 
It was in the foregoing noted that the principle of presumption of innocence seems absent 
in the de-listing procedures.
159
 This Comment relates to two questions: First, whether the 
Committee when reviewing a listing is able to make an assessment without the 
preconceived idea that the person has committed the acts in paragraph 2 of Resolution 
1617. Second, whether the transfer of burden of proof on the petitioner (in de-listing cases) 
is in line with the legal requirements under the Conventions. 
  
As noted in paragraph 3.2.5.1, the Committee does not require that the individual or group 
has been faced with a criminal charge or conviction prior to listing. When listed, the 
individual is faced with the presumption of involvement in international terrorism. 
Furthermore, the norms outlining the formal criterion for listing presumes guilt with respect 
to certain acts linking him or her to Al-Qaida, Taliban and their associates. As stated in the 
Engel case, the wording in ECHR Article 6(2) deals specifically with the proof of guilt.
160
 
Currently, there exists no requirement of proof of guilt or intent under the Guidelines. 
Furthermore, judicial proceedings by Member States are not required after the inclusion on 
the list. I will return to this argument under the discussion on access to court (section 
5.2.6).    
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A petitioner (individual, group, undertaking or entity on the Consolidated List) must 
actively approach the Committee to seek their removal from the List. The petitioner may do 
so either through the ―diplomatic remedy‖ or through the focal point within the UN. It was 
in the foregoing observed that it is the petitioner that must provide evidence in support of 
the de-listing request.
161
 Thus the burden of proof is placed on the accused and not on the 
Committee. It follows however from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, that Article 6(2) does not 
prohibit rules which transfer the burden of proof to the accused, as long as the overall 
burden of establishing guilt remains with the ―prosecutor‖.162 In addition, any rule which 
shifts the burden of proof or which applies a presumption operating against the accused, 
must be confined within ―reasonable limits which take into account the importance of what 
is at stake and maintaining the rights of the defence‖.163 The question thereby arises if the 
Committee’s procedures are confined with ―reasonable limits‖. In the Pham Hoang case 
the ECtHR considered the presumption not to be violated were the defendant has the 
opportunity to rebut a presumption of guilt.
164
 With respect to listing, a petitioner may 
establish a defence but may not have the opportunity to rebut possible guilt, as it is not a 
requirement under Resolution 1735.  
 
The lack of transparency related to the statements of cases and limited information on the 
criterion for de-listing, imposes serious challenges on the petitioners ability to present 
relevant documentation to the Committee. Access to evidence used must be seen as a 
prerequisite to establish a case in support of de-listing. It must also be seen as a 
precondition to be able to prove that conditions for listing are no longer met.  
 
Even if Committee measures must be regarded as administrative; one should still offer 
listed individuals the opportunity to demonstrate change of behaviour or factual mistakes. 
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Resolution 1735 paragraph does in some way recognize this problem but possibilities for 
contradiction (equality of arms) are limited.    
 
If sanctions against listed individuals were characterized as criminal charges, then the 
required evidence for listing would have to meet the standard of ―beyond reasonable 
doubt‖. But if one supports the conclusion that the Security Council and the Committees’ 
measures are administrative, then one also accepts that evidentiary standard for listing may 
be lower and not uniform. Given that the Committee defines its own measures as 
administrative and because there are currently no procedural rules on evidentiary standards, 
it is possible that not all listings meets the requirements provided for in the Convention. 
The Watson Institute has voiced the need for an increase of the evidentiary standards when 
the individual has been listed for five years or more.
165
     
5.2.6 Access to court – the right to be heard  
The right of access to court is implicit in the right to a fair trial under ECHR Article 6(1).
166
 
Access to court implies that the person who is ―charged‖ has the right to institute 
proceedings and be heard by a competent court.
167
 It also implies a right to challenge the 
evidence against him, as recorded in the principle of presumption of innocence. Paragraph 
3 of Article 14 in the ICCPR elaborates on the requirements of a ―fair hearing‖ in regard to 
the determination of a criminal charge.  
 
None of the Security Council Resolutions (1267, 1390, 1617, 1730 or 1735) at issue 
provides the right to be heard by the Sanctions Committee before they are included on the 
List. This means that persons or groups concerned cannot make known their views on the 
correctness of the facts which justify inclusion. In the Yusuf case the CFI ruled that such a 
                                                 
165
 Watson Institute (2006), p. 14. Statement refers to continued listing.  
166
 Golder v. United Kingdom, para. 35.  
167
 Cf. ICCPR, Article 14(3c).   
 46 
―restriction‖ on the right to be heard is not improper in light of the mandatory prescription 
of international law.
168
  
5.2.6.1 Background in the Yusuf case 
Ahmed Ali Yusuf (hereafter Yusuf), a resident of Sweden of Somali origin Yusuf was 
placed on the List 9 November 2001.
169
 Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation 
(established in Sweden), filed a case before the CFI challenging the financial sanctions 
imposed against them. The applicants alleged breach of their rights to a fair trial, effective 
judicial review and respect for property. All three claims were dismissed.  
 
In the Yusuf case the CFI stated that:  
 
‖it is unarguable that to have heard the applicants before they were included in that 
list would have been liable to jeopardise the effectiveness of the sanctions…‖170  
 
The CFI also held that:  
 
―a measure freezing funds must, by its very nature, be able to take advantage of a 
surprise effect and to be applied with immediate effect‖.171  
 
The CFI’s assessment is based on the possibilities of re-examination given by the 
Committee (the diplomatic remedy). It is interesting to note that the Court found the 
diplomatic remedy to be a sufficient procedure to rebut any claims about violations of the 
right to be heard. 
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At present there exists no independent body at UN-level with the mandate to review the 
accuracy behind listings. At UN-level, the focal point as described under section 3.4.1 
plays an important part in the review process. However, individuals, entities or their 
counsel have no presence before the Committee. Only states have standing in the United 
Nations. Thus, one could argue that neither an administrative focal point nor the Committee 
provides for a mechanism where individuals can de facto present their cases and be heard. 
Advocates against this argument would however contend that, current procedures clearly 
prescribe a right to be heard via submission in writing to the focal point or through their 
State of residence. Yet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights is of the opinion 
that present measures are far from being a comprehensive solution to the problem.
172
 
5.3 Limitations to the right to a fair trial 
At this point it must be noted that the Security Council may derogate from the rights 
protected by Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR. The Council may do so in 
situations determined as emergency situations classified as an international threat to the 
peace.
173
 Such a situation would for example allow the Council to reverse the presumption 
of innocence on those allegedly involved in international terrorism, or apply limitations to 
the right of access to court. However, derogation is subjected to a strict principle of 
proportionality. According to the Human Rights Committee, derogation should be strictly 
required by the exigencies of the actual situation.
174
  
 
It must be noted that Article 14 of the ICCPR and Article 6 of the ECHR, as primary rule, 
applies to courts and tribunals. The Security Council is a political organ mandated to take 
action within the scope of the Charter. Therefore, one must examine whether these 
procedural rights are part of international peremptory law which should also be observed 
by the Security Council. 
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5.4 The principles of due process as norms of jus cogens 
The peremptory character of some human rights norms is affirmed in judicial practice. 
According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the prohibition 
of torture has generated a particular high status in the international normative system.
175
 
Principles such as the prohibition of genocide, slavery and racial discrimination are also 
considered to be peremptory.
176
 In judicial practice it is held that not all human rights are 
part of peremptory law.
177
 It falls therefore to be assessed if the principle of fair trial as 
provided for in Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 14 of the ICCPR can be regarded as 
peremptory norms which the Council may not derogate from.  
 
Fassbender has held that customary international law does not provide for sufficiently clear 
rules which would oblige international organisations to observe standards of due process 
with respect to individuals.
178
 He supplements to his argument the notion that a trend can 
be perceived widening the scope of customary law in regard to due process to include the 
actions of international organisations.
179
 It is debated whether a formally derogable right 
under the human rights treaties can form part of jus cogens. Categorization of rights into 
derogable and non-derogable is not the same as dividing human rights norms into jus 
cogens and jus dispositivum.
180
 It is however clear that derogable rights under treaty 
instruments can become part of jus cogens. Orakhelashvili has held that existing judicial 
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practice proves the peremptory status of due process guarantees.
181
 There is reason to 
underline that no general agreement on this question exists.    
  
5.5 Substantive rights 
5.5.1 Introduction 
I shall now turn to the examination of selected substantive rights which are possibly 
affected by the Sanctions Committee’s measures. The point to be made in this section is 
that if listing and subsequent sanctions are not the determination of a criminal charge, then 
one must examine if these measures fit into the scope of ―civil rights‖.  
5.5.2 Scope of civil rights and obligations 
The term ―civil rights‖ has an autonomous meaning under the ECHR.182 Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR applies to civil rights. Whether or not a right is to be regarded as civil must be 
determined by reference to the substantive contents and effects of the right.
183
 Within the 
meaning of Article 6(1), property is one area where the ECtHR has consistently held 
Article 6(1) to be applicable.
184
 Furthermore, proceedings concerning damages caused to 
one’s reputation may also be determined.185  
5.5.3 The right to property 
Article 17(1) of the UDHR provides that ―everyone has the right to own property alone as 
well as in association with others.‖ Article 17(2) further prescribes that ―no one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his property‖. The equivalent right is recorded in Article 1 of 
                                                 
181
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Protocol I of the ECHR.
186
 There are inherent legal limitations to the right to property 
under the ECHR. 
 
Freezing of funds by Member States pursuant to Security Council resolutions may be seen 
as confiscatory in nature comparable to expropriation (without the compensation). In the 
Kadi and Yusuf cases the applicants claimed infringement upon their rights to make use of 
their properties. In both cases the CFI answered the question in the negative and based its 
ratio decidendi on the assessment that only property rights as far as it qualifies as a norm of 
jus cogens should be protected. According to the CFI, only the arbitrary deprivation of the 
right to property might be regarded as contrary to jus cogens.
187
 In the Courts view the 
existence of humanitarian exemptions (derogation from freezing measures) weakens the 
argument that restrictions to the right to property are contrary to human rights.
188
 The CFI 
added to its argument that the freezing of funds are temporary measures not ―decisive‖ for 
a civil right.
189
 But is listing really a temporary measure? As has been noted, listing does 
not include an ―end date‖. Freezing of assets may effectively run for as long as terrorism 
poses a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter. 
   
5.5.4 The right to reputation 
The point of departure is Article 17 of the ICCPR and Article 12 of the UDHR. As laid 
down in the provisions, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
his ―privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to the unlawful attacks on his honour or 
reputation. The relevant question in this context is whether inclusion on the List may 
qualify as an unlawful attack on a person’s honour or reputation.  
 
                                                 
186
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187
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Eckes has put forward the argument that listing harms someone’s reputation to the point of 
destroying it and leads in itself to an impairment of the target’s rights.190 Furthermore 
listing, in her view, threatens for example the economic existence of any business 
person.
191
 Her arguments presumably refer to those listed by mistake or on false grounds. 
According to Cameron, the Council’s definition of ―association‖ identifies a named 
individual as a terrorist suspect or as assisting terrorists.
192
 
 
Another interesting aspect is the possible infringement of the right to reputation with 
respect to innocent third parties whose names appear on the List. This problem may be 
illustrated through the following example:  
 
A quick search of the List shows that some entries include the names of mothers, fathers or 
even spouses of targeted individuals.
193
 In this way, actions of the targeted individual are 
implicitly linked to possibly innocent third parties. Not only is it a burden for the third 
party to have its name connected to the List. It is also problematic from a legal point of 
view because these innocent third parties are not granted a right to be heard. For example, 
if an individual is listed and the name of his/her spouse is added to its identifying 
information, effectively only the actual listed individual has the right to petition for 
removal.  
 
As a consequence of making this information public, innocent third parties may experience 
problems for example when travelling or when opening a bank account. One might argue 
that retaining this information is unproblematic since it is only listed parties (with a 
reference number) who are subjected to sanctions. Some might even say that the format of 
the List cannot be misunderstood. However, for the untrained eye or with respect to public 
officials, banks, or controllers at various border points – this practice might cause 
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confusion. One must acknowledge that a list with almost 500 entries create the need to 
conduct quick searches. In this process, mistakes can be made.    
 
Another issue linked to the current format of the List and the right to reputation, has to do 
with the final section of the List. The final section highlights names and identifiers of de-
listed individuals or entities. It is relevant to examine the legal concerns and explain the 
Committee’s rationale for retaining this information. 
 
Retention of names of de-listed parties may continue to stigmatize individuals and entities 
no longer subjected to sanctions. It is hard to see any benefit from keeping this information. 
Does it really prevent terrorism? This argumentation is supported by the Monitoring Team 
for the Committee. In its fifth report, the Team noted that: Comparable lists of terrorists 
(European Union and the United States) do not include persons and groups after their 
formal de-listing.
194
 As a result, the Team recommended the Committee to discontinue 
publishing this part of the List.  
 
The rationale behind retaining information on de-listed parties is that it may provide the 
general public and Member States with important information on the activities of the 
Committee. Furthermore, information on de-listings illustrates significant developments 
within the sanctions regime as such. More importantly, it generates transparency. However, 
one could advocate for a different approach. Perhaps the Committee should look into ways 
of compiling a separate List (made public on the Committee’s website). Consequently, the 
general public would still be able to retain the information. Such an approach would more 
clearly distinguish between current targets and the targets that are no longer subjected to 
sanctions.  
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6 Remedies available for targeted individuals and entities  
6.1 Introduction 
In previous sections affected substantial and procedural rights have been examined. Now, 
the question is: who has the legal competence to check that 1267 Committee procedures 
and relevant resolutions are in accordance with the rule of law? The point of departure for 
the following examination is the argument that: ―There is a lack of consideration to 
remedies available to individuals whose human rights have been violated in the sanctions 
process‖.195 This argument touches upon the right to effective remedies.  
 
There is a degree of overleap between ECHR Articles 6(1) and 13.
196
 However, effective 
remedies will be discussed separately as this section will have a more theoretical approach.  
6.2 The right to effective remedies   
Article 8 of the UDHR prescribes that: ―Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by 
the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted by the 
constitution or by law‖. Under Article 13 of the ECHR, the right to a remedy can only be 
invoked in conjunction with violation of another right under the Convention.
197
 The main 
rights at issue are those of ECHR Article 6. ECHR Article 13 further prescribes effective 
remedies for possible breaches of the Convention before a national authority. In accordance 
with the ECHR a review body must have the legal power to deal with the cases before them 
in an effective manner.
198
  
6.2.1 Remedies available at the national level 
Assume that a person has been listed on the basis of a Committee decision. This decision 
effectively obliges Member States to impose all three sanctions on individual X. Assume 
also that individual X files a civil or criminal case before the domestic courts claiming 
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breaches of its due process rights in connection with Security Council sanctions under the 
Charter. What should a national court do?  
 
As explained above, decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter are legally binding on all 
Member States. Thus States are obliged to impose these sanctions under Articles 25 and 48 
of the Charter. Therefore, whenever domestic courts review Security Council measures the 
issue of compliance with its treaty obligations arises. A claim that the Security Council or 
the Committee has breached due process rights, challenges national courts to indirectly or 
directly assess possible limitations to the Council’s Chapter VII powers. Should a national 
court find that international human rights law has been violated, then this may lead to direct 
confrontation with the Security Council. Is it likely that a domestic court would conduct 
such a controversial review?  
 
After the Committee listed the Netherlands branch of the Al-Haramain Foundation and its 
chairman Aqeel Al-Aqil, the Dutch Public Prosecution Service attempted to ban and 
dissolve the organisation (Stichting Al-Haramain Humanitarian Aid).
199
 In January 2006, 
an appeals court upheld a district court decision against the Government because of 
insufficient proof of support of terrorism. The appeal court found that dissolving the 
organisation went further than asset freeze required by the UN.
200
 The assets remain frozen.  
 
It is generally accepted law that international organisations, hence the United Nations 
enjoys immunity from suit before national courts.
201
 One can therefore argue that domestic 
courts will be moderate with respect to review of Council decisions. Nevertheless, national 
courts will always have legal competence to review the question against applicable 
domestic legislation such as in the case referred to from the Netherlands. In Norway, the 
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Directive on ―Sanctions against Usama bin Laden, Al-Qaida and the Taliban‖ which 
implements Resolution 1267 into Norwegian legislation would be applicable.
202
 
 
It is also possible that domestic courts could decide to implement sanctions only after a trial 
at domestic level – in line with criminal standards and due process. Such a review is also 
controversial because, even though the domestic court might not find evidence that a crime 
has been committed, this does not mean that the Sanctions Committee will remove the 
individual from the list. As has previously been pointed out, a criminal proceeding is not 
required prior or post listing.
203
  
 
Scheinin has opted for the view that if evidence of association or membership with Al-
Qaida or the Taliban exists, then the affected State should have an obligation to prosecute 
natural and legal persons in order to clarify their status. He further contends that placement 
on the List should not be considered evidence for the legal procedure in question.
204
 In 
essence the Special Rapporteur recommends that domestic courts should have legal 
obligation to verify that no errors of assessment have been made by the Committee. One 
could argue that this is a controversial recommendation. Subsequently, it seems 
procedurally challenging to require that a domestic court should disregard placement on the 
List as evidence.  
6.2.2 Legal proceedings before regional courts 
European Courts have so far been reluctant to provide judicial review against UN sanctions 
and listing. In the Yusuf case the European Court of First Instance speaks of ―trespassing 
upon prerogatives of the UN Security Council‖.205 In its judgement the CFI observed that it 
lacked jurisdiction to directly review claims as regards the UN sanctions regime and human 
rights. In the press release made public after the Kadi and Yusuf judgements, the CFI stated 
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that it was not for the Court to verify that there had been no error of assessment of the facts 
and evidence relied upon by the Security Council.
206
 Nor would it check the 
appropriateness and proportionality of Council measures.
207
 Thus the CFI has taken a 
careful approach.  
 
However, in the Yusuf and Kadi cases the CFI considered it self competent to review, 
indirectly, the lawfulness of Security Council resolutions. By indirectly, the Court meant 
review from a jus cogens perspective. Consequently the Court recognized that the UN and 
the Council are bound by peremptory norms when acting under the Charter’s Chapter 
VII.
208
 In both judgements the CFI rejected the applicants’ claims alleging breach of their 
right to an effective remedy, because it did not consider the right as absolute or part of the 
higher hierarchy of peremptory norms.
209
  
 
The CFI has acknowledged that at present there is a lacuna in the judicial protection 
available to individuals and entities on the Consolidated List. However, this was also not 
found to be contrary to jus cogens. The Courts assessment is based on a correct legal 
interpretation of international law because the right to an effective remedy is not 
absolute.
210
 Consequently, the right to effective remedies may be derogated from in public 
emergencies or by analogy when declaring a threat to international peace and security 
under Chapter VII of the Charter.  
 
Bulterman contends that judicial review of Council measures (conducted from a jus cogens 
perspective) by a regional court is problematic because it may undermine the role of the 
Security Council when it comes to international peace and security.
211
 One might contend 
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that the Security Council has the power to prevent possible scrutiny of its own powers. The 
Council could for example establish an independent review body at UN-level. In the 
meaning of ECHR Article 13, a judicial authority is not required in order to conduct an 
effective review.
212
 However, the authority should have the legal competence to 
independently review the factual and the judicial grounds of the case.
213
 The Committee 
could for instance expand the mandate and competences of the focal point. Former 
Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Mayoral has also stressed the need for greater 
progress as regards an independent revision mechanism.
214
  
 
At the time of writing, no case on the Consolidated List is filed or pending before the 
ECtHR. Filing a case before the European Court of Human Rights requires exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, thus it may take several years before such a case might have recourse to 
Strasbourg supervision.
215
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7 Concluding remarks 
 
Through a descriptive and normative approach, the aim of this thesis has been to give the 
reader a better understanding of the United Nations working methods and procedures when 
preventing and countering terrorism pursuant to Al-Qaida, the Taliban and their associates. 
Much has been written on counter-terrorism policy post September 11
th
, but as examined, 
the United Nations counter-terrorism framework has had a solid legal and political basis 
before the year 2001.
216
  
 
The importance of combating all forms of terrorism must not be underestimated. Terrorism 
is a threat to all states and to all peoples. It also constitutes a direct attack on the rule of law 
and peaceful resolution of conflicts. By the same token, the United Nations and the 
Security Council must not compromise on the core values of human rights and rule of law 
in its fight against terrorism.  
 
Targeting individuals and entities with sanctions and including their names on a list, has 
resulted in effects that go beyond the UN’s intentions. As has been examined in the 
foregoing, the Sanctions Committee’s procedures raise many concerns with respect to due 
process and the rule of law.  
 
As is evident from the arguments provided for in the paper, the Security Council and the 
Committee enjoys wide discretional powers. Their decisions are outcome of political 
consideration, not legal reasoning.
217
 However, current working methods arguably have 
legal implications with respect to human rights norms. 
 
Furthermore, there is a lack of clarity with respect to the language laid down in the 
procedures for listing and in the requirements for de-listing. This problem is in many ways 
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reinforced by the lack of transparency and the need for public information on authoritative 
interpretations conducted by the Committee.  
 
More can be done about the existing lacuna with regard to judicial review and effective 
remedies. To increase accountability, one should examine ways of reviewing the facts and 
evidence presented before the Committee. As has been addressed, an independent and 
impartial form of review at UN-level would perhaps strengthen the legitimacy of the 
sanctions regime.     
 
It must be noted that some of these concerns have already generated several discussions 
within the Committee and amongst Member States. Positive developments such as 
Resolution 1735 (2006) marks important steps towards achieving fairer procedures. 
However, lack of consensus often slows down the Committee and little can be done 
without political will.   
 
Norway has given its support to the work of the 1267 Sanctions Committee and supports 
efforts aimed at identifying how the Consolidated List can be expanded to cover other 
organisations.
218
 Such a strategy should possibly be accompanied by an equally high 
priority to bilateral talks aimed at fostering fair procedures.  
 
As the former Chairman of the Committee has so rightly acknowledged; ―In the fight 
against terrorism we often get the sense that we are walking on a razor’s edge to strike the 
right balance between preventive and swift action against terrorists and adequate 
safeguards for the individual, not least for those unjustly targeted‖.219 I believe that getting 
this balance right will strengthen the legitimacy of the sanctions regime and the 
achievements of the United Nations. We must expect that the sanctions regime will 
continue to improve in the future.
220
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